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THE JUVENILE COURT-BENEVOLENCE IN THE STAR CHAMBER
MATTHEW J. BEEMSTERBOER
"[F]airness and justice certainly recognize that
child has the right not to be a ward of the State,
not to be committed to a reformatory, not to be
deprived of his liberty, if he is innocent. The pro-
cedure for ascertaining the guilt or innocence of a
minor may be . .. [called] a civil inquiry ...
but in substance and form it is a trial-a mo-
mentous trial.. . because the defendant's whole
mature life still lies before him. And no matter
how trained and experienced a Juvenile Court
judge may be, he cannot by any magical fishing
rod draw forth the truth out of a confused sea of
speculation, runwr, suspicioan and hearsay. He
must follow certain procedures which the wisdom
of centuries have established."
Dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Musmanno, In re
Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 613, 109
A.2d 523, 529 (1954).
Could anyone quarrel with this statement? The
majority of the Justices of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court did, despite the fact that the federal
constitution and the constitutions of the several
states guarantee that liberty shall not be taken
from anyone without due process of law. As with
all generalities, however, this constitutional guar-
antee is not universal in its application. It applies
to traitors, perverts, murderers, and petty thieves,
but not to children appearing before the juvenile
court. Consider, for instance, the following case
illustrations.
Edward, aged 43, was accused of willfully and
maliciously breaking the window of a dwelling
house. There was some evidence that this incident
was part of a conspiracy to intimidate the owner of
the residence, who, up to that time, had refused to
permit the installation of a "juke box" in his place
of business. The conspiracy could not be estab-
lished, but the rock-throwing incident was wit-
nessed by several neighbors. Edward was arrested
upon a warrant, bound over to the grand jury by a
magistrate, indicted, and arraigned. He entered a
plea of not guilty. Represented by counsel, he was
tried by a jury of his peers, convicted upon the
testimony of eye witnesses and sentenced to jail for
three months (the maximum allowable under law
being six months). During the entire proceeding,
including his subsequent unsuccessful attempt to
obtain a reversal upon appeal, Edward was at lib-
erty on bail.
On the other hand, consider the case of Martin,
aged 13, against whom juvenile proceedings were
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instituted on the petition of an eighth grade school
teacher. The petition alleged that Martin was "de-
linquent and in need of care, guidance and con-
trol." No details of the alleged delinquency were
given. The juvenile court ordered Martin placed
in a county home pending a hearing. No warrant
was issued for his arrest, but notice was given to
his parents, stating the time and place of the
hearing and compelling their attendance. The hear-
ing took place partly in the courtroom, but mainly
in the judge's chambers out of the presence of
Martin and his parents. No counsel was present nor
was there a trial by jury. Bail was not available.
The school teacher, though unsworn, reported to
the judge in his chambers and out of the presence
of Martin and his parents that a female classmate
of Martin's told her that Martin broke her living
room window on the previous Halloween. The
teacher also stated that she had beard that Martin
had participated in other pranks that evening.
Upon this ex parte report, consisting essentially of
hearsay, Martin was committed to a state reforma-
tory until he was rehabilitated but in no case to
extend past his twenty-first birthday, a period of
almost eight years.
The above cases, though hypothetical, are based
upon the law of a particular jurisdiction.' Edward,
the adult, was tried for the offense which he was
alleged to have committed. He received the protec-
tion of the federal and state constitutions and was
accorded all the requisites of due process applicable
to criminal proceedings. However, Martin, the
juvenile, was not tried for his misdeeds; instead he
was protected from himself through the benevolent
exercise of the state's power as parens patriae. True,
Martin was not placed in contact with adult offend-
' The state is Pennsylvania. There, a petition to the
juvenile court need allege no more than the condition
of delinquency and a need for supervision. PENN.
ANN. STAT., ch. 11, §247 (1943). Custody pending
hearing is specifically provided along with notice to
the parents, compelling their attendance. PENN. ANN.
STAT., ch. 11, §248 (1943). Hearsay evidence was held
admissable, if not objected to, and an ex parle hearing
was sustained in In re Holmes, 329 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d
523 (1954). See also Commonwealth v. Firsher, 213
Pa. 48, 62 AtI.198 (1905). Trial by jury is dispensed
with. PENN. ANN. STAT., ch. 11, §247 (1943). Segre-
gated custody for youthful offenders is provided.
PENN. ANN. STAT, ch. 11, §249 (1943). A child ad-judged to be delinquent does not acquire civil dis-
abilities. PENN. ANN. STAT., ch. 11, §261 (1943). An
appeal from the judgement of the juvenile court is a
matter of right. PENN. ANN. STAT., ch. 11, §257 (1943).
Willful and malicious destruction of property is a
misdemeanor and the maximum sentence is six months.
PENN. ANN. STAT., ch. 18, §4916 (1943).
ers, nor were the proceedings publicized. True, the
evidence from these proceedings could not be used
in any subsequent proceedings nor were any civil
disabilities acquired therefrom. It is also true that
Martin was specifically guaranteed the right to
appeal by statute. But, on the basis of precedent
in this jurisdiction, the juvenile court could and
probably would be upheld upon appeal.
The basic discrepancy between these two pro-
ceedings suggests itself. Even though both persons
committed identical offenses, Edward was pro-
tected by every device known to the law to assure
him a fair trial. He was found guilty and punished
with a sentence of three months in prison. Martin,
however was not tried; he was the recipient of the
benevolent guardianship of the state and as a result
could be detained for as long as eight years in a
training school.
These hypothetical cases are admittedly ex-
treme, but to some extent they could occur in any
jurisdiction. The problem in this area, stripped of
all its technical niceties, is this: "Are children en-
titled to the protection of the Constitution of the
United States ... (and of the appropriate state
constitution)?"' 2 One's immediate response to such
a question would be: "Of course." The courts have,
however, employed a legal fiction which avoids
this seemingly obvious answer. They insist that
proceedings before the juvenile court are civil, not
criminal. Thus the specific constitutional guaran-
tees and the requirements of procedural due process
applicable to criminal proceedings are not applied
in juvenile cases. When faced with the rather em-
barrassing reminder that certain guarantees, for
example, the privilege against self-incrimination,
are applicable in civil actions and before admin-
istrative agencies, the courts then refer to juvenile
cases as neither civil nor criminal in nature, but as
special or statutory proceedings. The state is said
to be exercising its power as parens patriae to re-
habilitate rather than to punish the juvenile, but
industrial homes, reformatories and training
schools may be somewhat less than benevolent.
Indeed, their similarity to prisons is much more
striking than their similarity to school playgrounds.
What factors have produced this trick of nomen-
clature in an attempt to justify the denial of con-
stitutional safeguards to juveniles? Two funda-
mental misconceptions may be noted:
1. A confusion between an adjudication of delin-
2 In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 616, 109 A.2d 523, 531
(1954).
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quency and the treatment subsequent to such an
adjudication. Juvenile proceedings are essen-
tially criminal when their subject matter is al-
leged delinquency and as such involve two
steps:
a. an adjudication that the juvenile has done
the acts cited (essentially a trial); and
b. treatment or rehabilitation (the substitute for
sentencing and imprisonment accorded to
offenders under the criminal law).
2. A confusion between an adjudication of delin-
quency (essentially a criminal determination)
and an adjudication of dependency or neglect
(essentially a civil determination).
A brief look at the origin and evolution of the
juvenile courts will indicate what the legislatures
were attempting to accomplish when they estab-
lished these tribunals. Later, what have been cited
as misconceptions will be discussed in view of what
history and the case law disclose.
Origin and Evolution of the Juvenile Court
Statutes establishing juvenile courts are a sig-
nificant departure from the common law treat-
ment of criminal offenses committed by minors. At
common law a child was incapable of committing a
crime until he attained the age of criminal respon-
sibility which was fixed at seven. Between the ages
of seven and fourteen, a rebuttable presumption
existed that a child was incapable of committing a
crime. After a child reached the age of fourteen he
was treated as an adult and the same sanctions
were applied to him.3 The purpose of the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction was closer to vengeance than
to deterrence or reformation.4 Many thought that
the application of criminal penalties to juveniles
was overly harsh, and steps were gradually taken
to modify the application of the criminal law to
youthful offenders.
The origin of the juvenile court is frequently
traced to the English courts of chancery, particu-
larly to their exercise of the power of parens pat-
rine.5 The courts of chancery were more flexible
than the common law courts, and perhaps this fea-
3 sPERWS, C IXMIAL LAw 729 (1957).
4 State ex rel. City of Minor v. Gronna, 79 N.D. 673,
702, 59 N.W.2d 514, 534, (1953). This case distinguishes
the common law treatment of offenders from the treat-
ment accorded minors under the statute. "It was not
the aim of the act to provide for the punishment of
such minors but instead to treat such minors not as
criminals but as wards of the state."
5In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871 (1915).
See also TAPPAN, JuvENr OFrNDERS (1949).
ture accounts for the origin of the informal and
supposedly civil nature of juvenile proceedings.
Chancery did not permit trial by jury, a feature
copied by most juvenile courts.
In America, the first development in juvenile
law occurred in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury with the establishment of separate penal insti-
tutions for youthful offenders. 6 In 1841, Massa-
chusetts established a probation system for juvenile
offenders, emphasizing rehabilitation rather than
punishment.7 Subsequently, Massachusetts re-
quired separate hearings and transportation for
juveniles in order that they not be commingled
with adult offenders. 8 In 1892, New York provided
separate trials, dockets, and records for children
under the age of sixteen 9 Illinois established the
first juvenile court in the nation in 1899. As early
as 1861, however, the mayor of Chicago had the
power to appoint a commissioner to hear cases in-
volving boys under the age of seventeen and to
place them on probation or in a reform school.13
• Juvenile courts were a reaction against the
extreme hardship worked by the enforcement of
criminal sanctions against youthful offenders who
were usually not beyond reformation. Since
through juvenile courts infants were no longer sub-
jected to adult penalties, different procedures were
established to determine whether the juvenile
needed the supervision of the state. The juvenile
courts proceeded to dispense almost completely
with what in criminal cases had been thought to
be required by specific constitutional guarantees
and the requirements of procedural due process.
This dispensation with the orthodox requirements
of due process was justified by referring to the
civil nature of the juvenile court's proceedings."
The state, exercising its inherent power as parens
6 TAPpAN, JuvEmr OnFENnans 555 (1949).
7 Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, ch. 453 (1869).
8 An Act to Regulate the Treatment and Control of
Dependent, Neglected and Delinquent Children, noted
in TAPPN Juvwmm OF ENDERS 555 (1949).
9 TPaqi, JUVENILE On-ENDERS 555 (1949).
10 Illinois, Private Laws (1867) at 31.
n Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 816, 229
N.W. 205, 207 (1929). "The appellant in the instant
case is not being tried in this proceeding for any crime.
The action is, in a sense, a special proceeding provided
by statute, wherein the state, by virtue of its authority
as parens patriae, takes jurisdiction of the incorrigible
child and commits it, not to jail for punishment, but
to a reformatory for its care, education, and training.
That such a statute and such a proceeding, without a
trial by jury, does not violate either the federal or the
state constitutional provisions, has been repeatedly
held." See also In re Knowack, 158 N.Y. 482, 53 N.E.
676 (1899); In re Turner, supra note 5.
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patriae, is attempting to rehabilitate the offender,
substituting itself for the natural parents or legal
guardians who have not properly looked after the
juvenile.' Overlooked, perhaps, is the fact that the
juvenile will be deprived of his liberty despite the
civil nature of the proceedings. Does mere nomen-
clature change the essential nature of the proceed-
ings?
Proceedings in the Juvenile Court: Safeguards
Held To Be Inapplicable
The statutes establishing the jurisdiction of ju-
venile courts are characterized as parental and
benevolent in nature. 3 Essential to the jurisdiction
of a juvenile court is a determination that the child
is either dependent, neglected, or delinquent.14 Among
the statutes conferring jurisdiction to supervise
juveniles are the Illinois Family Court Act 5 and
the Federal Juvenile Court Act."8
The Illinois statute subjects all persons under
the age of 17 years to the guardianship and control
of the court if they are adjudged to be dependent,
neglected, or delinquent.17 Proceedings are insti-
tuted upon the written petition of any citizen of
the county wherein the juvenile resides and this
petition, to be sufficient, must merely allege that
the child is dependent, neglected, or delinquent.' 8
The juvenile court may retain jurisdiction for an
indeterminate length of time but in no case beyond
the twenty-first birthday of the juvenile in ques-
tion. 9 The act, and in this respect it is not typical,
2State ex re. Stearns County v. Klasen, 123 Minn.
382, 143 N.W. 984 (1913).
13 E.g.,In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 127, 96 Pac. 563,
564 (1908). This case involved a habeas corpus applica-
tion to remove a child from the State Industrial Train-
ing School. The court upheld the 'Juvenile Court Act,
deeming it to be benevolent in nature. "Its object is
to confer a benefit upon both the child and the com-
munity."
" In re Warren, 40 Wash. 2d 342, 343, 243 P.2d
632, 633 (1952). The court lacked jurisdiction since
dependency had not been established. "The mere fact
that certain individuals invoke the aid of our courts
to litigate the question of who shall have custody and
control of a minor, does not, ipso fato, vest our courts
with jurisdiction to decide the issues thus presented."
See also In re Crozier, 44 Wash. 2d 901, 904, 272 P.2d
136, 138 (1954). "The juvenile court has no jurisdiction
over a minor unless it is proved that a minor is either
(a) a delinquent or (b) a dependent child. . . .The
concept that all children are wards of the state, and
that the state and its agencies have an unhampered
right to determine 'what is right for the child' is... an
idea. ... repugnant to American institutions."
15 ILL Rzv. STAT., ch. 23, §2001-2019 (1957).
16 18 U.S.C. §5010-5037 (1948).
17 ILL. Rlv. STAT., ch. 23, §2001 (1959 Pocket Part).
Is I'6 . REv. STAT., ch. 23, §2006 (1957).
19 ILL. Rzv. STAT., ch. 23, §2016 (1957).
provides for a trial by a jury of six persons, if de-
manded," and further provides that the evidence
obtained cannot be used in any subsequent pro-
ceedings.21 As a result of proceedings under the act,
a child may be remanded to the custody of its par-
ents (subject to the visitation of a probation offi-
cer), placed in a foster home, placed in the custody
of a guardian, or sent to one of the institutions
operated by the Illinois Youth Commission.22 Tlie
jurisdiction of the Family Court is not exclusive,
although the statute would seem to indicate so,
since the Illinois Constitution confers primary
jurisdiction upon the circuit courts in all criminal
cases.N
The federal statute gives the juvenile an elec-
tion between a criminal trial* before the district
court or proceedings before the juvenile court.U If
the juvenile elects to be tried before the juvenile
court he must make an intelligent waiver of several
of his constitutional rights, chiefly the right to a
public trial and the right to a trial by jury.2 5 The
juvenile may be committed for any period not
exceeding his minority, but in no case may he be
committed for a period in excess of that for which
he might have been committed had he chosen to
stand trial before the district court.26 Bail may be
set at the discretion of the committing magistrate. 7
The Illinois and federal statutes are somewhat
progressive, guaranteeing the juvenile some safe-
guards. Most state statutes omit any provisions
regarding the observance of either constitutional
safeguards or the orthodox requirements of pro-
cedural due process.2 8 The courts have not been
quick to read these safeguards into the statutes.
Statutes establishing juvenile courts- have been
subjected to vigorous attack as denying due process
of law, providing cruel and unusual punishments,
denying equal protection of the laws, and as an un-
warranted interference with the relationship be-
tween parent and child.2 These attacks have come
20 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 23, §2002 (1957).
21 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 23, §2001 (1957).
"ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 23, §2009, 2013 (1957).
"People v. Lattimore, 362 Ill. 206, 199 N.E. 275
(1936); People ex rel Malec v. Lewis, 362 Ill. 229, 199
N.E. 276 (1936).18 U.S.C. §5032 (1948).
25 18 U.S.C. §5033 (1948).
26 18 U.S.C. §5034 (1948).
- 18 U.S.C. §5035 (1948).
2E.g., IowA CODE, tit. XI, ch. 231, 232 (1949);
IND. ANN. STAT., ch. 10, §813-20 (1956); KANs. GEN.
STAT., ch. 38, §405-508 (1949); Miss. CODE ANN.
§7185.01-.30 (1942); NEB. Rav. STAT., ch. 43, §200-
408 (1949); PEN. ANN. STAT., ch. 18, §240-259 (1943).
29 Wheeler v. Shoemake, 213 Miss. 374, 404, 57 So.
2d 267, 281 (1952). This case was a habeas corpus
19601
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
to little avail for proceedings under the statutes
have been almost invariably upheld. The failure of
these attacks on the juvenile court acts is not sur-
prising in view of the failure of similar attacks on
statutes providing for the summary commitment
of sexual psychopaths.?
Though the proceedings in the juvenile court
are said not to require the formal procedural re-
quirements of other courts of record, certain gen-
eral requirements are usually insisted upon such as
jurisdiction, findings supported by the evidence,
and at least the rudiments of due process." When
proceeding to obtain the release of a juvenile on the
grounds that he was convicted by a criminal court
while under eighteen years of age in direct contraven-
tion of the juvenile court act. The respondent put the
constitutionality of the statute in issue. The court said:
"The view has generally been taken that [such statutes]
are not unconstitutional by reason of dispensing with
certain procedural steps and safeguards which are
usually regarded as essential in criminal prosecutions,
such as trial by jury, arraignment or plea, or notice to
the person, or a warrant of arrest, or because of a
provision requiring the child to be a witness against
himself. Such statutes have also been held not to be
unconstitutional ... as depriving children of the equal
protection of the laws, or of due process of law or as
providing for the imposition of cruel or unusual punish-
ment or as unlawfully interfering with the relationship
of parent and child." See also; Ex pare Nacarrat, 328
Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931); In re Santillanes, 47
N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943). Here, the juvenile
court act was upheld over the constitutional objection
that it failed to afford protection against doublejeopardy and self-incrimination, that it failed to
provide for notice to either parent or child, and that
no provision was made for appellate review. The court
further held that the fourteenth amendment did not
guarantee trial by jury in juvenile proceedings. Even
though adults would be entitled to jury trial when ac-
cused of the same offense, the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment was not thought to
require that children be proceeded against in the same
manner.
10 Compare the treatment of juvenile offenders with
the treatment of "sexually dangerous persons" under
ILL. R v. STAT., ch. 38, §820-29 (1957) wherein the
proceedings are declared to be civil in nature and where
the sentence is for an indeterminate time, that is until
recovery, but where the right to counsel and trial by
jury are preserved.311n re Holmes, 175 Pa. Super. 137, 146, 103 A.2d
454, 459 (1954). The court held that proceedings
before the Juvenile Court are actions "in a court of
record, the court must have jurisdiction, its basic
findings must be supported by evidence and the rudi-
ments of procedural due process and fair play must be
observed. The record must be legally and factually
adequate to sustain the findings of fact and order of
commitment .... The action of the juvenile court is
always subject to appellate review and correction for
errors of law or abuse of discretion." Despite the state-
ment quoted above, the Superior Court and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania allowed Holmes"
probation to be revoked on hearsay evidence, without
notice to him or his parents, without a jury, without
warning him concerning his privilege against sdf-in-
crimination and without counsel.
translating the general into the specific, however,
the courts have tended to dispense not only with
the requirements of procedural due process but
also with specifically enumerated constitutional
guarantees. The juvenile is not being tried for a
crime; his feet are being placed on the "path of
rectitude." The following sections will consider
some of the safeguards, usually guaranteed in
criminal proceedings, which have been dispensed
with in juvenile proceedings.
Warrant for Arrest
Since juvenile proceedings are said to be civil in
nature, the juvenile is not arrested in the technical
sense of the word. Citation or its equivalent is
adjudged to be a satisfactory substitute for a
warrant. When the juvenile is cited in a petition as
delinquent, the court immediately takes custody
of the juvenile, pending an investigation by court
officials. The law of arrest is thus inapplicable to
juvenile proceedings in most jurisdictions. 2
Indictment or Information
Although due process does not require any par-
ticular method for the institution of criminal pro-
ceedings, it has always been thought that if either
indictment or information were the appropriate
method, then equal protection of the laws required
that all persons be proceeded against in the same
or a similar manner.P Most courts have refused to
require the same or a similar manner of citation in
juvenile proceedings. Generally, a petition alleging
that a child is dependent, neglected, or delinquent
is sufficient to initiate proceedings against a ju-
venile.-
Notice to the Person
The courts have frequently held that no formal
notice to the child or to the persons having custody
2 State ex rel. Palagi v. Freeman, 81 Mont. 132, 262
Pac. 168 (1927); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 Pac.
609 (1907); Iindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E.
892 (1913); Wheeler v. Shoemake, supra note 29.
But see: Freestone v. State ex rd Advance-Rumely Co.,
98 Ind. App. 523, 176 N.E. 877 (1931).
3 State ex re Cave v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 21, 166
S.W. 1028, 1033 (1914). The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri held that the juvenile court statute violative
the state constitution on the ground that "[Ain in-
dictment or information being necessary to a prosecu-
tion for a violation of the laws of the state, it must be
such as is meant by the common law, viz., in the one
instance be found and presented by a grand jury, and
in the other be instituted by a public officer authorized
to prosecute crimes.... Failing to require these neces-
sary prerequisites in the exercise of jurisdiction over
offenders, the act cannot be sustained."
4 IL. R1v. STAT., ch. 23, §2016 (1957). See also
note 28, supra.
[Vol. so
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of the child is necessary. 3 Where the authorizing
statute requires notice to both the juvenile and to
the parents, voluntary appearance, though notice
had not been given, may constitute a waiver of
notice. Such a waiver must have been made with
knowledge that notice was required by the
statute.36
Arraignment and Plea
Arraignment has been considered an unnecessary
step in juvenile proceedings. The juvenile is not
being charged with a crime, according to the courts,
and thus arraignment serves no real purpose.37 The
entering of a plea of guilty or not guilty has not
been thought to be required for similar reasons.
One court has gone so far as to say that not only
is a plea not required, but also that a plea is ab-
solutely void, for the statute in question required
the magistrate to act solely upon the evidence and
not upon the admissions of the juvenile.38
Bail
Even though a youth is alleged to have com-
mitted a felonious act which is ordinarily bailable,
bail is not made available in most juvenile cases.
In one jurisdiction, however, while an appeal was
pending, bail was required and the amount of bail
was required to be set at an amount which was not
excessive.' The federal statute authorizes the
district judge to set bail at his discretion."
Privilege Against Seqf-Incrimination
Generally the courts do not agree upon the ap-
plicability of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in juvenile proceedings. 42 Despite the fact that
35 See note 29 supra. Freestone v. State, 98 hid.
App. 523, 176 N.E. 877 (1931). Function of notice is
served by the appointment of a guardian ad litem in
this jurisdiction. See also Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio
St. 184 (1869).
36 199 Misc. 1075, 107 N.Y.S.2d 896, afd., 280
App. Div. 268, 113 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1952).
Wheeler v. Shoemake, supra note 29; Mill v.
Brown, supra note 32.
'7Harris v. Souder, 233 Ind. 287, 119 N.E.2d 8(1954).
"Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576(1945). The petitioners were adjudged to be delinquent
children. They filed a writ of habeas corpus to secure
bail pending an appeal. The court held that proceed-
ings under the delinquency act, VE.RN. ANN. Civ.
STAT., art. 2338 (1941), were civil and not criminal
and that under the civil rules, bail is available at the
court's discretion and may be witheld.40 Ex parte Osborne, 127 Tex. Crim. 136, 75 S.W.2d
265 (1934). The court treated the juvenile proceeding
as essentially a criminal case and held that the juvenile
was entitled to bail, and that bal should not be ex-
cessive as guaranteed by the state constitution.
41 18 U.S.C. §5035 (1948).
41 Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1128, 1133-35 (1955).
the privilege applies in civil as well as criminal
cases, the majority of courts refuse to apply it in
juvenile proceedings." Some courts hold the privi-
lege applicable unless the statute grants immunity
from subsequent proceedings involving the same
offenses" Confessions made by juveniles are ad-
missible in most jurisdictions,'45 but they cannot be
the sole basis for the findings of the court in the
majority of jurisdictions.46
Right to Counsel
Many courts insist that a juvenile is entitled to
be represented by counsel, but usually the court is
under no duty to advise the youth of his right to
counsel nor is it required to provide counsel if he is
unable to procure oneY.7 Frequently the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem is said to be sufficient
representation. 41 In Shioutakon v. District of
Columbia,49 the court insisted that the juvenile in-
volved had the right to be informed that he was en-
titled to engage counsel or to have counsel named
in his behalf, but a later district court decision
does not follow this case.'
41 Freestone v. State, 98 Ind. App. 523, 176 N.E.
877 (1931), Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E.892 (1913) (a dependency proceeding); Mill v. Brown,
supra note 32; State ex re Palagi v. Freeman, supra
note 32.
4In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282(1947). Statute permitted admission of confessions
made without any warning regarding self-incrimina-
tion. See also People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E.
353 (1932), cert. denied 289 U.S. 709 (1933).
45In re Holmes, 329 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954);
In re Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954);
State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So.2d 242 (1951);
re Santillanes, supra note 29.
46 People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E.
584 (1927); People ex re Deordio v. Palmer, 230 App.
Div. 397, 244 N.Y.S. 727 (1930) (the charge was
established upon a plea of guilty rather than other
competent evidence and therefore was set aside).
47Ex parte State ex ret Echols, 245 Ala. 353, 17
So.2d 449 (1944). Court held that a juvenile was not
entitled to counsel at the state's expense. See also In re
Schaeffer, 126 A.2d 870 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1956).
While a child has the right to representation by counsel,
failure to advise him of this right is not a denial of due
process.
49 Summerour v. Fortson, 174 Ga. 862, 164 S.E. 809(1932).
49 236 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956). "Since an
intelligent exercise of the juvenile's rights requires
legal skills not possessed by the ordinary child under
18 . . . a juvenile is entitled to be represented by
counsel .... Our concern for the fair administration ofjustice impels us to hoid that in this and in similar cases
in the future, the juvenile must be advised that he has
a right to engage counsel or to have counsel named on
his behalf. And, where that right exists, the court
must be assured that any waiver of it is intelligent
and competent."
0 In re Schaeffer, supra note 47.
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Trial by Jury
In the absence of a specific provision for jury
trial, most courts hold that a trial by jury is un-
necessary. The justification for this dispensation
may lie in the origin of the juvenile courts; trial by
jury was unavailable in the courts of chancery. The
New Mexico court, in In re Santillanes5' refers to
the equitable nature of the proceedings and insists
that although an adult charged with the identical
offense is entitled to trial by jury, equal protection
of the law does not require that a juvenile be ac-
corded the same protection. Similar results have
been reached in most jurisdictions where the con-
stitutionality of statutes establishing juvenile
courts has been challenged for failure to provide
equal protection of the law by denying trial by
jury.5 2 In federal juvenile proceedings the dispen-
sation with trial by jury is justified on a waiver
theory. The federal statute4 specifically provides
an option to the juvenile to choose between a
criminal or a juvenile proceeding and by exercising
this option he is deemed to have waived his right
to a trial by jury.',
Definite Accusation
The federal constitutional guarantee, and its
counterpart in most state constitutions, that every
accused shall know the character of the accusations
against him seems to have no applicability in the
juvenile court. Typical statutes 55 provide that any
citizen of the county in which the juvenile resides
5147 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
0 In re O'Beirne, 194 Or. 389, 241 P.2d 874, 875
(1952). The court held that a jury trial was unnecessary
since "a juvenile court enjoys . . . a latitude in pro-
cedure not known or permitted in courts trying crimi-
nal cases." In Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 6
N.E. 830 (1886), a jury trial was dispensed with on
the theory that the proceeding is not a final adjudica-
tion but merely an investigation. State ex rel Olson v.
Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 52 N.W. 935 (1892), was a
habeas corpus proceeding to obtain the release of a
minor child from a state reform school on the grounds
that his detention resulted from a proceeding in which
he was denied his right to a trial by jury in violation
of the state constitution. The court held the proceed-
ings to be civil in nature, aiming towards reformation
and not punishment and that the guarantees applic-
able to criminal proceedings were unnecessary in
delinquency proceedings. See also: Milwaukee In-
dustrial School v. Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328
(1876); People ex rel Bradley v. Illinois State Reforma-
tory, 148 Ill. 413, 36 N.E. 76 (1894); People ex rel
Martin v. Mallary, 195 Ill. 582, 63 N.E. 508 (1902).
s 18 U.S.C. §5033 (1948).
" Pamplin v. United States, 221 F.2d 557, 558
(10th Cir. 1955).
5 ILL. Rxv. STAT., ch. 23, §2006 (1957); PENN.
STAT. ANN., ch. 11, §247 (1939).
can petition the court to take jurisdiction over the
juvenile; to be sufficient the petition need state
little more than the bare allegation that the child
is dependent, neglected, or delinquent. The Wis-
consin court in In re Bentley 6 held valid a proceed-
ing in which the petition alleged that the juvenile
in question habitually deported himself so as to
injure and endanger the morals of himself and
others and was delinquent. The court held that the
complaint was sufficient under the statute and did
not consider the issue of vagueness and indefinite-
ness although it was raised. The federal courts
seem to meet this objection inasmuch as the ju-
venile is charged with a specific offense and then is
given his option to be proceeded against as a ju-
venile or in the district court in a criminal pro-
ceeding. 57
Public Trial and Confrontation
Many statutes provide that the proceedings in
the juvenile court must take place in the judge's
chambers. 58 This is done to avoid notoriety. While
privacy may be a laudable objective, frequently
not only the public but also the juvenile involved,
and his parents, are not present when evidence is
taken. The Pennsylvania court, in In re Holmes,55
upheld the revocation of a juvenile's probation and
his commitment to an industrial home in a proceed-
ing where testimony was taken out of his presence.
The court intimated that the dispensation with a
public trial also permitted the reception of evidence
in an ex parte proceedingY5
Same Penalty for Same Offense
A careful reading of the Illinois statute6 indi-
cates that any minor over the age of twelve can be
committed to an institution operated by the Youth
Commission until he reaches the age of twenty-one
for an act which, if committed by an adult, would
56246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944). See also; In
re Duncan, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 173, 107 N.E.2d 256
(1951), where the complaint was held to be sufficient
although it merely alleged that the child involved was
dependent.
17 See notes 53 and 54 supra.
58 Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269
(1944). The exclusion of the general public was held
to be proper since it saved the juvenile from embarass-
ment and permitted the-absence of unfavorable pub-
licity.
59379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).60 Ibid.; but see the dissenting opinion of Musmanno,
J. at p. 535: "The 14th Amendment to the Constitu-
tion... guarantees ... as due process of law.., the
right to face one's accuser, to summon witnesses in
one's defense."
61 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 23, §2001-20 (1957).
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not even be punishable, or if so, would only be
punishable by a fine or a short period of incarcera-
tion. Courts acting under similar statutes have de-
dared that an indeterminate term of supervision is
not a denial of due process, or of equal protection of
the law nor a cruel or unusual punishment12 The
usual justification for the continuance of the juris-
diction of the juvenile court for an indefinite term
is that reformation cannot be attained in a definite
period of time. Since the purpose of the juvenile
court is to reform youthful offenders, the court must
be able to continue its supervision until the juvenile
is no longer in need of such guidance or until he
is no longer a minor 3
Sworn Testimony
Some courts have specifically recognized the
necessity for sworn testimony in juvenile proceed-
ings." While an oath has generally been thought to
be an essential pre-requisite to the reception of tes-
timony, some courts, for less than persuasive rea-
sons, have upheld the adjudication of a juvenile as
a delinquent solely on the basis of unsworn testi-
mony. In Stale v. Scholl," the probation officer who
had investigated the petition requesting that a
juvenile be adjudged delinquent testified, thotigh
unsworn, in an ex parle hearing held in the judge's
chambers. The substance of the officer's testimony
was that the boy involved had confessed to being
in railroad yards frequently and that other boys
had verified this information. This information was
held to be sufficient to sustain the commission of
the juvenile as a delinquent.6
6 Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176
(1931); Ex parte Birchfield, 90 Okla. Crim. 197, 212
P.2d 145, 148 (1949). A married girl, aged thirteen, was
committed to the reformatory for an indefinite term
not to exceed her minority. The sentence was in excess
of that which an adult could have received for the
same offense, but the court stated: "To commit a
juvenile for a definite period of time would require the
presumption that reformation could be attained in a
definite period of time. Such a presumption would
certainly be unwarranted."
63 See generally note 29 supra. See also: In re Gomez,
113 Vt. 224, 32 A.2d 138 (1943); In re Hook, 95 Vt.
497, 115 Ati. 730 (1922).
6In re Manteil, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308(1954). The defendant was charged with delinquency
and proceeded against under the juvenile court act.
Unswom testimony was used against him. The com-
mittment was reversed on the grounds that the juvenile
had been denied due process of law. See also Mill v.
Brown, supra note 32; Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1128, 1145(1955).
65 167 Wis. 504, 167 N.W. 830 (1918).
Is Id. at 832. "In such investigations we know of no
rule which prevents the use of investigation and 'un-
sworn testimony in ascertaining essential facts. ... ,
Good results are far more likely to be obtained in this
Burden of Proof and Rules of Evidence
Juvenile courts have generally applied the civil
rules regarding the admissibility of evidence and
the burden of proof. Thus, in a juvenile proceeding,
the accusation need not be established beyond a
reasonable doubt, but merely by the preponder-
ance of the evidence. 67 Some jurisdictions have
recognized the criminal nature of the proceedings,
particularly where a serious offense has been in-
volved, and have applied the criminal standards of
proof, requiring that the allegations be established
beyond a reasonable doubt.6 8 Hearsay has been
admitted as competent evidence in many jurisdic-
tions, at least for whatever probative value it might
have.69 Some jurisdictions allow hearsay merely for
impeachment purposes but not as proof of the
alleged delinquency. 70 Testimony taken outside the
way by the use of informal methods. .*. . It may be
advisable ... that sworn testimony be taken and the
essential facts thus proven before the final order is
made . . . [but] [i]n the present case the boys were
simply put on probation, and we regard the proceedings
taken as entirely sufficient, although no witness was
sworn. The investigations of the probation officer and
the facts brought out by the kindly questioning of thejudge upon the hearing substantiate the fact of de-
linquency fully as well as sworn testimony." (Emphasis
added.) See also State ex rel Christensen v. Christensen,
119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951).
6 Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184
(1928). People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353
(1932), cert. denid 289 U.S. 709 (1933).
8 In re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765
(1931) (requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt to
substantiate the petition). Jones v. Commonwealth,
185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946) ("Guilt should
be proven by evidence which leaves no reasonable
doubt. Inferences must give way when in conflict with
facts established by positive proof.").
6 In re Holmes, supra note 45, at 626: "From the
very nature of the hearings in the Juvenile Court it
cannot be required that strict rules of evidence should
be applicable as they properly would be in the trial of
cases in the criminal court. Although, of course, a
finding of delinquency must be based upon sufficient
competent evidence... hearsay evidence, if it is ad-
mitted without objection and is relevant and material
to the issue, is to be given the natural and probative
effect and may be received as direct evidence. But see
the dissenting opinion of Musmanno, J., at 632: "Injustification of this incredible procedure, the Majority
... says that it is proper to receive hearsay when it is
admitted without objection. What did Joseph Holmes
know about objections? He is a minor. He had no
lawyer to advise him. No one informed him of his
rights. He was not told he could object. A child in a
courtroom amid a throng of police officers, probation
officers, court attendants and other officials, with ajudge officiating from a podium, is not apt to summon
the brashness, even if he possessed the knowledge, to
lift his voice and cry that what a police officer testified
to was hearsay, even if he knew what hearsay meant."
70 In re Mantell, supra note 64; In re Green, 123
id. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647, 649 (1952). A juvenile
1960
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presence of the juvenile, thus denying him an
opportunity to cross-examine has sometimes been




Frequently, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
is not exclusive and the case, if it involves a serious
offense, can be removed to the criminal court.7 3
After a juvenile court has adjudged a minor to be
delinquent, it could be argued that jeopardy has
attached and that the minor could not again be
tried for the offenses involved. However, in the ab-
sence of a clear statutory prescription to the con-
trary, this is not the law. The Illinois statute
establishing the Family Court prohibits the use of
evidence obtained in juvenile proceedings in any
subsequent proceeding in any other court, but this
does not answer the defense of double jeopardy
which could be raised.7 4
Right To Appeal
In most instances where appellate jurisdiction
has been invoked to consider the judgment of a
juvenile court, it has been invoked collaterally by
way of habeas corpus. Most statutes do not pro-
vide for direct appeal. The courts are about equally
divided as to whether a right to appeal exists when
the statute is silent. Some courts hold that appeal
in a juvenile case is not a constitutional right and
thus must be conferred by statute.7 5 Other courts
hold that unless the right to appeal is specifically
was adjudged to be a delinquent on the basis of an ex
pare report of a court officer, which consisted almost
entirely of hearsay and was made to the judge in his
chambers. The appellate court reversed the decision
of the juvenile court stating: "The petition reveals a
star chamber proceeding whereby a boy was torn from
the custody of his parents and deprived of his liberty
without a semblance of due process and by reason of ajudgement thatwas not merely erroneous but absolutely
void." (Emphasis added.) In re Hill, 78 Cal. App. 23,247
Pac. 591 (1926). See generally Annot. 43 A.L.R.2d
1128, 1141 (1955).71 
n re Mantell, supra note 64; State ex rel Palagi
v. Freeman, 81 Mont. 132, 262 Pac. 168 (1927).7
2In re Holmes, supra note 59.
73 People ex re Malec v. Lewis, 362 Ill. 229, 199
N.E. 276 (1935). The criminal court exercised its
power to remove the case from the juvenile court
after the minor involved had been adjudged to be a
delinquent.
71 IL. REv. STAT., ch. 23, §§2001, 2914 (1957).
7 Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W.
205 (1929). The court held that there was no appeal
from the decision of the juvenile court since, "At
common law the right of appeal was unknown. It is
purely a creature of statute." See also State v. Mc-
Donald, 206 La. 732, 20 So.2d 6 (1944).
withheld, appeal may be taken at least regarding
matters of law. 7
6
In view of what history and the case law have
demonstrated, a discussion of the two fundamental
misconceptions noted earlier now appears to be in
order.
1. A confusion between an adjudication of delin-
quency and the treatment subsequent to such an
adjudication. Delinquency proceedings are es-
sentially criminal in nature and involve two
steps:
a. an adjudication (essentially a trial) and
b. treatment or rehabilitation (the substitute
for sentencing and imprisonment accorded
offenders under the criminal law).
Only in this second step (i.e. treatment) should
criminal law procedure properly be deviated from.
Rehabilitation may be substituted for punishment,
but a star chamber cannot be substituted for a trial.
The law and lawyers have abdicated their respon-
sibility in this area. The legislatures have drafted
loosely worded statutes which failed to provide
any safeguards for the juvenile accused of delin-
quency. The courts have not felt compelled to pro-
vide these safeguards when called upon to interpret
the statutes, insisting that they deny every safe-
guard which they do not specifically enumerate.
In its eagerness to modify the application of
criminal sanctions to youthful offenders the law
has been beguiled by the disciplines of sociology,
psychiatry, and psychology.77 These disciplines are
invaluable in the rehabilitation of youthful offend-
ers, but they have no place in the essentially legal
determination of whether the juvenile has com-
mitted the act or acts cited to sustain the delin-
quency petition.78 It has been insisted that a child
should not be subjected to a trial and its attendant
formality because irremediable traumatic shock,
rendering treatment more difficult, would result.
However, the equally traumatic experience which
befalls the juvenile who, though he has not com-
mitted the acts constituting the alleged delin-
76 Review may also be had through an extraordinary
writ. Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah. 473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907);
or by certiorari, State ex rel Jones v. West, 139 Tenn.
522, 201 S.W. 743 (1918).
7 See criticism of legal proceedings and insistence on
"informality" and treatment of the "total personality"
in: BEARD, JuvENILE PROBATION (1934); YOUNG,
SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY(1937); Lou, JuvEN. CouRTs IN THE UNITED
STATES (1927).78See GLUECK, TnE PROBLEM OF DELINQUENCY
322-33 (1959) for a criticism of the indiscriminate
coupling of adjudication and treatment.
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quency, is rehabilitated against his will has been,
for the most part, ignored. Whatever traumatic
shock might result from a completely legal proceed-
ing would be more than compensated for by the
restoration of constitutional safeguards to juvenile
proceedings. Once the juvenile has been adjudged
to be a delinquent, then and only then should the
law refer to those best equipped to help him.
2. A confusion between an adjudication of delin-
quency (essentially a criminal determination)
and an adjudication of dependency or neglect
(essentially a civil determination).
The courts can find no scapegoat for the indiscrim-
inate coupling of delinquency, neglect, and de-
pendency. The legislatures have carefully delin-
eated what constitutes each of these categories but
have failed to provide separate procedures to deter-
mine the existence of any one of them. The cases
heretofore examined cite dependency cases as
authority for dispensing with certain safeguards in
delinquency cases. The confusion which results ig-
nores the essential nature of the various proceed-
ings.
Delinquency proceedings are essentially criminal,
and the procedure used should be patterned after
the criminal law, with all of its safeguards, requir-
ing that the allegations should be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Whether the proceeding be
called a hearing, an investigation, or any other
euphemism, the child is being tried for his misdeeds.
Benevolent sentencing cannot compensate for an
autocratic trial or for no trial at all.
Dependency or neglect cases, on the other hand,
involve a true exercise of the power of parens
patriae and should be patterned after the civil law
requiring that the allegations be proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. In these cases, the
state is taking the place of the parent who is unable
or unwilling to care for the child. No stigma at-
taches to the child; it is not his commissions which
are being adjudicated, but rather the omissions of
his parents. Here a civil proceeding is appropriate;
the child is not accused of anything. He is the
wronged, not the wrongdoer.
Recent Cases Providing Safeguards for Juveniles
Since the establishment of the first juvenile court
in 1899, the courts have been fairly unanimous in
describing the proceedings as civil in nature. Where
the enabling statute has not provided otherwise,
the courts have dispensed with almost every pro-
cedural safeguard known to criminal trials.
Logically the designation of delinquency proceed-
ings as civil in nature is unsound since the proceed-
ings result in an interference with the personal
liberty of the juvenile. Recent cases have dis-
carded the civil versus criminal test and have es-
tablished two new tests to determine whether safe-
guards should be accorded the juvenile:
1. What is necessary for a fair adjudication?
2. Is the essential nature of the proceedings such
as to result in a deprivation of personal liberty?
Fair Adjudication Test
In People v. Dotson79 a minor was convicted of
murder, burglary, and robbery in the Superior
Court after the juvenile court had relinquished
jurisdiction. On appeal Dotson claimed that since
he was not advised of his right to have counsel and
since no counsel was provided he had been deprived
of his constitutional rights. The dissent agreed with
Dotson, reasoning that if be had been provided
counsel, the juvenile court might have been per-
suaded to retain jurisdiction. In that instance, the
defendant would never have been tried for the
offenses in a criminal proceeding." The majority of
the court, however, held that he was not entitled to
counsel since no undue advantage was taken of him
in the juvenile proceedings. Nevertheless the court
insisted that minors are entitled to all the safe-
guards which are necessary to insure that they are
accorded fair treatment.8'
Essential Nature of the Proceedings Test
In re Poffl2 was a habeas corpus proceeding
brought to test the validity of a sentence imposed
by the juvenile court. A minor, aged seventeen,
was accused of using automobiles without the per-
mission of the owners and unlawfully taking per-
sonal property. The issue in this case was whether
due process required that a child have the effective
assistance of counsel when he has committed an
offense which if committed by an adult would re-
quire such assistance. The court decided that such
assistance was a necessary requisite of due process
and remanded the case. The court stated: "This
79 46 Cal.2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).
80 See also State v. Barkus, 95 N.W.2d 670 (Neb.
1959).
81 See note 79 supra at 877. "The fact that a minor
is not represented by counsel need not be a denial of
due process .... It is only when ... undue advantage
is taken of him or he is otherwise accorded unfair
treatment resulting in a deprivation of his rights that
it can be said he has been denied due process of law."
u135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1954).
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Court stands steadfast in the belief that the Federal
Constitution ... cannot be nullified by a mere
nomenclature. It seems to me to follow as a matter
of law that a boy of seventeen cannot competently
waive his right to counsel in a criminal case."
' 3
United States v. Dickerson, decided recently by
the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, was a proceeding to dismiss a criminal
court indictment on the grounds that it violated
the defendant's constitutional right not to be
placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
Dickerson had previously been brought before the
juvenile court and had acknowledged his guilt.
The court had adjudged him to be delinquent and
had continued the case for social study pending
disposition. The district court held that jeopardy
had attached upon the adjudication of delinquency
and that the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy applies to proceedings in the
juvenile court. The case is significant, more for its
reasoning than for its result. Courts have previ-
ously held one safeguard or another applicable in
juvenile proceedings, but this court has cast aside
the fiction that delinquency proceedings are
nothing more than a specie of the civil action. The
court stated: "Ineluctable logic leads to the con-
clusion that the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy, as is the case with the right of
counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination,
is applicable to all proceedings, irrespective of
whether they are denominated criminal or civil,
if the outcome may be deprivation of liberty of the
person. Necessarily, therefore, this is true of pro-
ceedings in the Juvenile Court. Precious constitu-
tional rights cannot be diminished or whittled
away by the device of changing names of tribunals
or modifying the nomenclature of legal proceed-
ings. The test must be the nature and the essence of
the proceeding rather than its title. If the result may
be a loss of personal liberty, the constitional safe-
guards apply." (Emphasis added.) 85
The federal statute"8 authorizes the juvenile
court to waive jurisdiction, and this right is in no
way abridged by the Dickerson case. Jeopardy does
not attach after an investigation or after a pre-
liminary hearing but only when in essence the
juvenile has pleaded guilty or has been adjudged
to be a delinquent. Then it is too late for the court
to waive its jurisdiction.
Not unexpectedly, the Court of Appeals for the
'3Id. at 226, 228.
84 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958).
5 Id. at 901-2.
86 18 U.S.C. §5032 (1948).
District of Columbia reversed the decision in the
Dickerson case, relying on the often repeated as-
sertion that the proceedings are civil in nature.
8 7
The case is still significant, however, since it marks
one of the rare instances where a court has recog-
nized that personal liberty is at stake in juvenile
proceedings.
Proposals for Future Action
Since the responsibility for the deplorable state
of the nation's juvenile courts must rest largely on
the shoulders of the lawyers who have ignored their
rightful role in this area, the organized bar should
take the following steps:
1. Bring test cases to the state supreme courts
in which the constitutional issues are dearly de-
fined. The spectre of a possible federal vindication
of the safeguards denied is a possible argument. If
the states refuse to act in this area, the United
States Supreme Court, reluctantly perhaps, may
intervene by way of certiorari or the federal district
court may vindicate the constitutional right or due
process objection collaterally by way of habeas
corpus.
2. Seek the introduction in state legislatures of
bills repealing the existing juvenile court acts and
replacing them with statutes incorporating as a
minimum the following:
a. Separate definitions of delinquency, dependency,
and neglect which are clear and unequivocal in
their terms.
b. Separate judicial, procedures for delinquency
proceedings on the one hand and dependency
and neglect proceedings on the other,
i. denominating delinquency proceedings as
criminal in nature and specifically providing
that all the guarantees applicable to criminal
trials are applicable to these proceedings,
ii. denominating dependency and neglect pro-
ceedings as civil in nature and specifically
providing that the guarantees applicable in
civil proceedings shall be applicable in these
proceedings.
87 United States v. Dickerson, 28 U.S. L. WEEK 2138,(D.C. Cir. Sept. 30, 1959). "The district court relied
on some early state cases which held that, once a plea
of guilty is accepted by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, jeopardy immediately attached. But those cases
throw little light on the issue before us. They are
traditionally criminal proceedings, which are es-
sentially accusatory adversary and punitive. Conse-
quently, they involve considerations which are not
relevant to the non-criminal parens palriae proceedings
of the Juvenile Court." The United States Supreme
Court may soon have an opportunity to decide this
vexing problem.
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c. A clear delineation between adjudication and
treatment. The proceedings should be legal in
nature and sociologists, psychiatrists, psychol-
ogists, probation officers and the like should be
called upon to intervene only after an adjudica-
tion has been made. Testimony of experts may
be taken in accordance with the standards ap-
plicable in other proceedings.
d. A dear statement of the age group over which
the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction and a
provision for the continuing jurisdiction of the
juvenile court until the juvenile reaches his
majority. A definite term of commitment should
be established in delinquency proceedings with a
provision for renewal by the court if the juvenile
needs further treatment. Provision should also
be made to enable parents, guardians, or the
court on its own motion to remove the juvenile
from the institution if he is detained after he
has been rehabilitated. A clear statement of the
various dispositions which may be made of the
juvenile in both types of proceedings is also
needed.
e. Benevolent provisions:
i. that an adjudication of delinquency shall not
operate as a civil disability,
ii. that evidence obtained in delinquency pro-
ceedings shall not be used in any subsequent
proceedings,
iii. that separate facilities for the custody and
transportation of youthful offenders be
provided,
iv. that in no case shall a juvenile, in a delin-
quency proceeding be placed under super-
vision for a period in excess of that for which
he could have been imprisoned had he been
tried as an adult.
f. Features for the protection of society against
incorrigible offenders:
i. imposition of criminal sentences on juve-
nile offenders, at least where the offense is
punishable by criminal sanctions,
ii. immediate suspension of the sentence and
delivery of the juvenile to the custody of
those agencies best equipped to rehabilitate
him,
iii. destruction of all records and vacations of
the sentence when the juvenile has reached
his majority and has been rehabilitated,
iv. enforcement of the remainder of the sen-
tence when the juvenile has reached his ma-
jority and has not been rehabilitated.
Great concern has been expressed in recent years
over the rising tide of juvenile delinquency. In at-
tempting to deal with larger numbers of youthful
offenders, juvenile proceedings will tend to become
even more summary than at present. Panaceas for
the solution of the delinquency problem continue
to appear and these proposals show less and less
awareness of the "essential nature of the proceed-
ings." The National Probation and Parole Asso-
ciation has revised its Standard Family Court
Act9s in an attempt to answer certain objections
which its previous efforts along this line have pro-
voked. This proposal not only merges delinquency,
dependency, and neglect cases into one common
procedure but completely abolishes the concept of
delinquency. Certain desirable features must be
noted:
a. The court must provide counsel for those who
are unable to procure legal assistance.$
b. The petition invoking jurisdiction must state
the facts upon which the juvenile is brought
before the court."
c. Compulsory process is available to the ju-
venile."1
d. Appeal is provided. 2
However, bail,"1 public trial", and trial by jury9 are
specifically withheld. "The hearings shall be con-
ducted in an informal manner" and as the com-
ment on this section reveals, the customary rules of
evidence do not apply since:
"the hearing should have the character of a
conference, not of a trial. Formal procedure is
incompatible with the informal conference at-
mosphere required by the court to gain the con-
fidence of child and parents, to elicit the per-
tinent facts of events, and to become familiar
with the personalities of the parties, their emo-
tional states, and the causes of the difficulty." 9
This concern with the "total personality" and not
with the acts cited to sustain the delinquency pe-
tition is the keynote of this proposal and others of
its ilk. If liberty is to be denied on the mere ob-
servation of the demeanor of the child, then in-
formality is merely a euphemism for the star
chamber.
83 5 National Probation and Parole Association four nal
100-160 (1959).






96 5 National Probation and Parole Association
Journal 138 (1959).
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